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Abstract. With the rapid development of Artificial Intelligence (AI),
the problem of AI security has gradually emerged. Most existing ma-
chine learning algorithms may be attacked by adversarial examples. An
adversarial example is a slightly modified input sample that can lead to
a false result of machine learning algorithms. The adversarial examples
pose a potential security threat for many AI application areas, especially
in the domain of robot path planning. In this field, the adversarial ex-
amples obstruct the algorithm by adding obstacles to the normal maps,
resulting in multiple effects on the predicted path. However, there is
no suitable approach to automatically identify them. To our knowledge,
all previous work uses manual observation method to estimate the at-
tack results of adversarial maps, which is time-consuming. Aiming at the
existing problem, this paper explores a method to automatically iden-
tify the adversarial examples in Value Iteration Networks (VIN), which
has a strong generalization ability. We analyze the possible scenarios
caused by the adversarial maps. We propose a training-based identifica-
tion approach to VIN adversarial examples by combing the path feature
comparison and path image classification. We evaluate our method us-
ing the adversarial maps dataset, show that our method can achieve a
high-accuracy and faster identification than manual observation method.
Keywords: value iteration networks · adversarial examples · path plan-
ning · path classification · automatical identification
1 Introduction
Due to the advances in machine learning and deep learning algorithms, AI has
developed rapidly in recent years. AI has helped humans solve many complicated
problems, such as image classification, face recognition, robot path planning and
so on[14,15,21].
However, with the development of AI, the vulnerability of the machine learn-
ing algorithms is gradually emerging. An adversary can take advantage of the
characteristics of the algorithm to disguise itself in order to fool the detection
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of the classifier[4]. More typically, for deep neural network structures, a well-
designed small perturbation at the input layer will result in a totally wrong
classification, which is so-called adversarial examples[7,9,17].
Adversarial examples bring forth potential security threats for AI applica-
tions. Depending on where the adversarial examples are generated, there are the
following two main situations. One situation assumes a threat model, in which
adversarial examples can be directly imported into the machine learning mod-
els. There has been lots of prior work proved that the adversarial examples can
be generated by adding fine-grained modification to the original data in areas
such as sound, image and text[2,4,17]. The other situation is physically realiz-
able attacks, where adversarial examples are input into the AI applications that
operate in the physical world. Up to now, there also has been many researchers
tried to generate adversarial examples in the fields of image classification and
face recognition[9,16].
However, few studies have focused on the adversarial examples in the domain
of robot path planning. With the rise of deep learning models, Deep Reinforce-
ment Learning (DRL) algorithms achieve a state-of-the-art performance in the
domain of robot path planning, such as VIN, DQN and A3C[13,18,21]. The fol-
lowing question thus arises: is there similar adversarial examples that may attack
the DRL algorithms in the domain of robot path planning?
Start
Goal
(a) the normal map
Start
Goal
An additional
 obstacle
(b) the adversarial map
Fig. 1. A pair of maps:(a) is the normal map with random obstacle configurations; (b)
is the adversarial map generated by attackers, which is the same as (a) except for an
additional obstacle.
Some prior work has found the adversarial examples that exist in the pro-
cess of robot path planning using some DRL algorithms, such as DQN, A3C,
and VIN [1,3,10]. From the literature review, we can find some commonalities
between the adversarial examples. In the process of robot path planning, the
algorithm can obtain the global map as the input data, and the task is to move
from the start to the goal avoiding the obstacles. Therefore, an adversarial exam-
ple for the path planning domain would consist of obstacle-level points adding
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to the target map (see Fig. 1), so that a human observer would recognize it as a
normal map, but a machine learning algorithm would plan a very different path
for it.
In this paper, we specially focus on the adversarial examples of VIN path
planning, which can achieve a better generalization compared with other DRL
algorithms [18]. In the paper [10], they have proposed a method that can generate
adversarial maps for VIN path planning by adding obstacles to the grid-world
domain. This method can automatically add obstacles based on the three rules
they defined to obstruct the process of VIN path planning.
However, there are some deficiencies in the adversarial examples identifi-
cation in [10]. Since it is not guaranteed that the generated adversarial maps
will obstruct the VIN path planning successfully, they evaluate the attack re-
sults through a manual observation method. More specifically, they manually
compared the two VIN-predicted paths to observe whether there are differences
between them. This manual evaluation method is time-consuming and ineffec-
tive. For example, when manually observing the path on each map, one need to
compare the paths with eyes, which can take at least a few seconds for each pair
of maps. Especially when generating a large amount of adversarial maps, it’s
not possible to quickly get feedback about the effect of attacks through manual
observation. Therefore, it is necessary to explore a method to identify the VIN
adversarial examples automatically.
Aiming at the existing problem of the manual observation method, we ex-
plore a fast approach to automatically identify VIN adversarial examples. As
previously mentioned, in order to estimate whether an attack is successful, we
need to compare the difference between the two paths on a pair of maps. There-
fore, we analyze the possible scenarios of the adversarial maps and define the
categories of the predicted pairs. In order to realize a large-scale detection, we
extract the two paths into one path image, and transform the path comparison
to path image classification according to defined categories. But the classifier
may be confused by the various shapes of the paths, so we also retain those eas-
ily distinguishable path feature to help the classifier to achieve a high accuracy.
In this way, we implement a fast and high-accuracy identification method for
VIN adversarial examples by combing the path feature and path images.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the
related works in this field. This is followed in Section 3 by details about the cate-
gories definition of adversarial maps. Section 4 describes the method we propose
for identifying the VIN adversarial examples automatically. Finally, Section 5
describes our experiments with the adversarial maps dataset.
2 Related Work
Since this paper is mainly focus on the adversarial examples in the domain of
robot path planning, aiming to achieve an automatic detection of VIN adver-
sarial examples. Therefore, in the related work of this paper, we investigate the
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existing research work in the field of adversarial examples, and discuss the fea-
sible methods to identify adversarial examples in the domain of path planning.
2.1 Adversarial Examples in Applications
From the literature review, the research of adversarial examples mainly focus on
the following three fields of AI applications.
In image classification Most of prior work pay attention to the adversarial
examples in the field of image classification, which are generated by adding fine-
grained per-pixel modifications to the input images [5,7,9,17]. As a result, the
adversarial examples generally will lead to a mis-classification.
In speech recognition There also has been researchers generating hidden voice
commands to attack the speech recognition system using synthesized obfuscated
speech [2]. In the field of speech recognition, the adversarial examples will cause
a wrong voice command executed by the device.
In Atari game The Atari games using DRL algorithms may also be attacked by
the adversarial examples, which are generated by adding noise to the background
of the game [8]. As a result, the adversarial examples will make the Atari game
not work.
In summary, the adversarial examples cause different attack results in dif-
ferent application fields. For some applications, the attack results are easy to
estimate, such as image classification, where there are just correct classification
or not. However, in the field of robot path planning, the adversarial maps cause
various impact on the path. Therefore, we need to explore a method to com-
pare the difference between the two paths to automatically estimate the attack
results.
2.2 Adversarial Examples identification in Path Planning
In order to compare the difference between the two paths, we do some research
about the related methods for the path comparison.
Trajectory Similarity Based Methods There are already many mature algo-
rithms to calculate the trajectory similarity, such as Hausdorff distance, Frechet
distance and DTW algorithms[19]. Or there are some ways to transform the
problem, such as calculating the area enclosed by the two paths, or calculating
the longest common subsequence(LCSS)[12]. Generally, these algorithms need to
traverse the whole coordinate points to calculate the trajectory similarity, which
require a large amount of calculation and time.
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Path Image Based Methods A representative algorithm for combining path
feature and images classification is proposed by [6], which enhances the images
with signature information to recognize handwriting characters. This is followed
by a algorithm for Chinese character identification[20], which recognize the Chi-
nese characters as finite paths. These methods avoid complex trajectory informa-
tion but use the path feature to enhance the machine learning to automatically
identify the images.
Inspired by these methods, this paper combines the path feature comparison
and path images classification. We visualize the two VIN-predicted paths of a
pair of map into one image, transforming the different cases of attack results
into different categories of path images. At the same time, in order to avoid
the situation where the path image classifier is confused by the various shapes
of paths, we also do path feature comparison. In this way, we can achieve a
high-volume and high-accuracy identification for VIN adversarial examples.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we analyse the possible impact of adversarial maps and define the
four categories of adversarial maps. In this way, we can transform the different
attack results to path images categories.
3.1 Definition of Path Pairs
VIN can predict a path for robot from start to goal position avoiding the obsta-
cles, according to the map with obstacle configurations. In this paper, the map
is a synthetic 28× 28 grid-world domain with randomly placed obstacles. Each
step in the path can advance in 8-directions.
We refer to an original map and an adversarial map as a pair of maps. In this
way, we recognize the VIN-predicted trajectories for a pair of maps as a pair of
path, the original path and the adversarial path. We describe the pair of path
in a Cartesian coordinate system, as shown in Fig. 2.
The paths can be expressed as follows:
Poriginal = (r1, r2, r3, ..., rn) (1)
where Poriginal represents the VIN-predicted path for the original map, ri is the
i th step of the path, which can be expressed as (xi, yi) in a Cartesian coordinate
system.
Padversarial = (v1, v2, v3, ..., vm) (2)
where Padversarial represents the VIN-predicted path for the adversarial map, vj
is the j th step of the path, which can be expressed as (xj , yj) in a Cartesian
coordinate system. And n and m are not necessarily equal.
Therefore, the definition of a pair of path is as follows:
PathPair = (Poriginal, Padversarial) (3)
Below we use the relationship between these pairs of paths to define the four
categories of adversarial maps.
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Fig. 2. A pair of paths: (a) is the original path which is predicted by VIN for the
normal map; (b) is the adversarial path for the adversarial map.
3.2 Categories Definition of VIN Adversarial Examples
As it came to be known, the adversarial maps may cause various impact on the
predict path. By visualizing the pair of paths on a path image, we transform the
different attack results into different categories of path images. We divide the
results into four limited categories as shown in the Fig. 3
From the visual observation, it is obvious to find the differences of the four
categories. In the unreached path (UrP) class, the adversarial paths can’t reach
to the goal position. In the fork path (FP) class, the two paths are very different,
forming a fork in the path. In the detour path (DP) class, the adversarial maps
do not affect the general direction of the path, where the adversarial paths
just simply bypass the additional obstacles. In the unchanged path (UcP) class,
the two paths are exactly the same, which means the adversarial maps do not
impact VIN path planning. We give the definition of these four cases based on
the description of the path pairs.
Four Categories of Adversarial Maps The impact of adversarial maps on
VIN path planning can be divided into four limited categories based on the
difference between Poriginal and Padversarial, which are UrP, FP, DP, and UcP.
The Unreached Path (UrP) Padversarial didn’t reach to the goal position.
That is
rn(xn, yn) 6= vm(xm, ym) (4)
The Unreached Path (UrP) There is a significant difference between
Poriginal and Padversarial, where the maximum vertical distance and the max-
imum horizontal distance in the part where Poriginal and Padversarial do not
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Fig. 3. Four categories of VIN adversarial maps. The first line is the original maps, the
second line is the adversarial maps, and the third line is the extracted path image.
coincide are greater than four. That is
max |xi − xj | > 4 where yi = yj AND max |yi − yj | > 4 where xi = xj
for i, j of the part where Poriginal 6= Padversarial
(5)
The Detour Path (DP) There is a slight difference between Poriginal and
Padversarial, where the maximum vertical distance and the maximum horizontal
distance in the part where Poriginal and Padversarial do not coincide are less than
or equal to four. That is
max |xi − xj | <= 4 where yi = yj AND max |yi − yj | <= 4 where xi = xj
for i, j of the part where Poriginal 6= Padversarial
(6)
The Unchanged Path (UcP) Padversarial is exactly the same with Poriginal.
That is
Poriginal = Padversarial (7)
It should be additionally noted that the critical value 4 is not an constant,
but is determined by the size of the map. When the domain becomes larger, the
adversarial maps may cause a larger fork in the path.
In this paper, it is considered that an adversarial map which can make a sig-
nificant change in the original path is a successful attack. Therefore, the adver-
sarial maps that cause the UrP and FP results are the VIN adversarial examples
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that attack successfully. Correspondingly, the adversarial maps that cause the
DP and UcP results fail to attack the VIN path planning.
4 Training-based identification for VIN adversarial
examples
In this section we will introduce the identification approach to VIN adversarial
examples. As mentioned previously, unlike other areas, the adversarial examples
in the domain of path planning will produce multiple attack results on the orig-
inal path. Therefore we identify the VIN adversarial examples according to the
pathpairs classification results.
4.1 Framework
The framework of the method is mainly divided into three modules, as shown
in the Fig. 4. The first module is to perform VIN algorithm on the map pairs to
generate the path pairs, which is called the VIN path planning module. Then,
the second module is to classify the four categories of the adversarial maps
by combining path feature comparison and path image classification, which is
called the classification module. At last, the classification results of the path
images are matched with the generated map pairs to identify the VIN adversarial
examples, which is called the identifying module. Below we will introduce these
three modules.
VIN Path Planning Module The generated map pairs are not guaranteed to
attack the VIN path planning successfully. A map pair contains an original map
and an adversarial map. The information on the original map, such as obstacle
configurations, start point and end point, are all random. And the adversarial
map is generated by adding an additional obstacle to the original map. After
VIN path finding module, there will be a path pair corresponding with a map
pair predicted by VIN. By studying the results of VIN path planning, we can
know whether the adversarial maps have attacked successfully.
PathPairs Classification Module Classifying the path pairs is the most
important module of our method. It is mainly divided into two parts, the com-
parison of path features and the classification of path images. Firstly, we classify
the UrP and UcP categories by comparing the obvious path features. For the
remaining path pairs where path features are not obvious, we transform them
into path images. Then we classify the FP and DP categories by training a path
image classifier. In this way, we classify the four categories and automatically
identify them as FP, DP, UrP and UcP.
Identification Module In order to achieve an automatic detection of VIN
adversarial examples, the final step in the method is to identify the adversarial
examples through the labels of the path pairs. We need to match the label
A Training-based Identification Approach to VIN Adversarial Examples 9
Path Feature Comparison
Path Image Classifier
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Map Pairs
Path Pairs
Path Pairs
Value Iteration Network
 Identifying the VIN Adversarial Examples
Adversaria Examples
Traning Dataset
FP DP UrP UcP
Success-FP Success-DP Unsuccess-UrP Unsuccess-UcP
Train
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Start
Goal
Fig. 4. The framework of VIN adversarial examples identification approach
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of the path pairs with the corresponding map pairs to determine whether the
adversarial maps successfully attack VIN, and then identify the VIN adversarial
examples. Therefore, in the identifying module, we finally identify the map pairs
as Success-FP, Success-UrP, Unsuccess-DP and Unsuccess-UcP.
4.2 Training-based Classification for Path Pairs
The main body of the algorithm is the classification module for the path pairs.
As described in Section 3, it is easily to find that UrP and UcP can be well
distinguished by path features, but it will take a lot of time to compare the
path features for DP and FP. Whereas, DP and FP can be well recognized by
the path images. The two paths of FP are very different, presenting an irregular
polygon shape, while the two paths of DP are similar, presenting a line shape.
But UrP and UcP are difficult to be recognized by the path images, for the
two pathes generally present a line shape. Therefore we combine of the path
feature and the path image to do the classification. We identify the UrP and
UcP through path feature comparison and identify the DP and FP through path
image classification. This allows for a large-scale and high-accuracy classification.
         Poriginal(rn) = 
            Padversarial(vm) ?
Poriginal = Padversarial  ?
UrPUcP
Yes
Yes
No
Path Image Extraction
No
PathPairs
Path Image ClassifierDataset Trian&Test 
FPDP
Path Feature 
Comparison
Path Image 
Classification
Fig. 5. The flow chart of classification module.
Path Feature Comparison We obtain the path pair of the map pair after the
VIN path planning module, which contain all coordinate points from the start
to the goal position. Firstly, we compare whether the last point in the two paths
is equal. If they are not equal, which means the adversarial path fails to reach
the goal, the path pair belongs to UrP category. Then we compare whether
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the points in two paths are completely equal. If they are equal, which means
the path has not been changed, the path pair belongs to UcP category. In this
way, through the obvious features of the paths, the UrP and UcP classes can be
quickly distinguished. Path pairs that cannot be classified by these two features
belong to the remaining DP and FP categories.
Path Image Classification For the DP and FP categories, the difference
between the paths is not obvious, and the coordinate points in the path cannot
be one-to-one correspondence. However, it can be seen from the path images
that the difference is obvious in the path shape. So we use the path image to
classify the DP and FP categories. We build a path image classifier, which is
trained and tested using the labeled path image database. And we use the built
classifier to classify the remaining path images of DP and FP categories.
4.3 Path Image Classifier Building
To build a path image classifier, we need to train the classifier with the path
image dataset as shown in Fig. 5. After the path map extraction process, the
path pairs are transformed into path images. We use the labeled path image
dataset to train several classifiers in order to select the classifier that best fits
the path image data. The built path map classifier will be used to classify new
path image data.
Path Image Extraction In the path map extraction process, we visualize each
pair of path in one path image. The pair of path are visualized with different
colours, where path in red represents the original path and blue represents the
adversarial path. In the portion where the two paths coincide, the red line covers
the blue line. It means that the blue path in a path image represents the part of
the adversarial path different from the original path. We visualize the path pair
on the same 28× 28 blank map to prevent obstacles affecting the classification.
Therefore, after the process of path image extraction, the same size path images
are generated for classifiers.
Classifier Selection For the selection of path image classifier, we mainly con-
sider two categories of classifiers, traditional classifiers and deep neural network
classifiers. In recent years, deep neural networka have performed well in the field
of image classification, especially Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) [14].
However, the training of CNN generally requires a large amount of dataset,
which is difficult to obtain for VIN path planning. Therefore, we also consider
the traditional machine algorithm that requires less training data, such as Sup-
port Vector Machine(SVM) [11]. Unlike the usual images, there is not much pixel
information in the path images. Nor can it be equivalent to character images, for
the path shapes of each path image are different. So we compare several classifiers
through experiments to select the most suitable classifier for path images.
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4.4 VIN Adversarial Examples Identification Method
The method for VIN adversarial examples can be summarized as follow. In the
algorithm, the input is the original map pairs Dmap, and the output is the
adversarial examples with label information Dadversarial. The three processes
of the method are VIN path planning, path pair classification, and adversarial
examples identification. We implement an automatic identification approach for
VIN adversarial examples. The specific process steps of the algorithm are shown
as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 VIN Adversarial Examples Identification Method
Input: Dmap = {MapPair1,MapPair2, ...,MapPairi, ...,MapPairn}
Output: Dadversarial = {(MapPair, PathPair, Label)1, ..., (MapPair, PathPair, Label)m}
1: Dmap
V IN−→ Dpath = {(MapPair, PathPair)}n1
2: extract D′path = {(PathPair)}n1 from Dpath
3: Dlabel = {(PathPair, Label)1, (PathPair, Label)2, ..., (PathPair, Label)n}
4: for each PathPairi in Dpath do
5: if Poriginal(rn) 6= Padversarial(vm) then
6: Labeli = UrP
7: else if Poriginal = Padversarial then
8: Labeli = UcP
9: else
10: Dpath image = Dpath image + PathPairi
11: end if
12: end for
13: Dpath image
Classifier−→ Dlabel image
14: Dlabel = Dlabel + Dlabel image
15: Matching Dlabel AND Dpath −→ Dlabel = {(MapPair, PathPair, Label)}n1
16: for each Labeli in Dlabel do
17: if Labeli = UrP OR FP then
18: Dadvesarial = Dadvesarial + (MapPairi, PathPairi, Labeli)
19: end if
20: end for
21: return Dadvesarial
5 Experiment And Evaluation
In our experiments, we generate map pairs using the method proposed in [10]
as experimental dataset. Then we use the algorithm designed in Section 4 to
identify the VIN adversarial examples. At last, we evaluate the feasibility and
dependability of our method.
5.1 Experiment Setup
The experiment setup mainly consists of the following steps:
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Experiment Environment We perform our experiments on the environment
shown as Table 1, and using the source code provided by [18] for VIN path
planning.
Table 1. The experimental environment.
No. Environment
Operation System Windows 10
CPU Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4510U @2.00GHz 2.60GHz
RAM 8GB
Hard Disk 1T
Programming Language python 2.7
Database mysql
Data Preparation We generate 5,000 pairs of maps. The original map is a
28 × 28 grid-world domain, where the obstacle configurations and start and
goal positions are all random. The adversarial map is generated by adding one
additional obstacle to the original map. We use the VIN algorithm to predict
paths for each pair of maps, so that we can obtain a pair of VIN-predicted
path (see Fig. 6). Because it takes a long time for VIN to process a map, it is
difficult to get a large number of path pairs. And since the map pair is generated
randomly, 5,000 pairs of maps can already contain all the possible situations. So
we used 5,000 map pairs as the dataset for our experiment.
Fig. 6. The examples of map pairs.
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Data Storage In order to implement the matching of map pairs, path pairs and
labels in the algorithm process, we store the original dataset in mysql database.
And it is also convenient to study the adversarial examples in the future work.
The structure of data table is designed as Table 2. No is an incremented sequence
number. The 0-1 matrix of the Map is drawn into a one-dimensional array,
separated by symbols and stored as varchar type, which is the same for Path.
Label contains the value {UrP, UcP, DP, FP}. Attack is a boolean value, where
1 means the attack is successful and 0 means the attack is unsuccessful.
Table 2. The structure of data table
Column Name No Map O Map A Path O Path A Label Attack
Data Type Int Varchar Varchar Varchar Varchar Varchar Boolean
Dataset Building In order to train the path image classifier, we need to build
the path image dataset of DP and FP. We use the obtained 5,000 path pairs
to generate 5,000 path images, and do image annotation for the DP and FP
categories. The dataset of DP and FP is shown in the Fig. 7.
The FP class
The DP class
Fig. 7. The path image database of DP and FP categories.
Experiment Evaluation Since the classifier in the paper is a binary classifi-
cation problem and the path image dataset is imbalance, we use the ROC curve
and Precision-Recall curve to evaluate the confidence of the classifier accuracy.
The larger the area under the curve, the higher the confidence of the classifier
accuracy.
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5.2 Evaluation And Analysis
We evaluate the dependability and feasibility of the method mainly from two
aspects, classifier accuracy and processing time. We compare three commonly
used classifiers to select the classifier that is most suitable for path image classi-
fication. We also compare the processing time of the training-based method and
the manual observation method to evaluate the feasibility of our method.
The distribution of the 5,000 path pairs dataset is shown as Table 3. It can
be seen that most of them are UrP category that fail to attack VIN, and the
data amount of FP category is the smallest.
Table 3. The data distribution of the four categories
Categories Unreached Path Fork Path Detour Path Unchanged Path
Quantity 1,632 204 1,076 2,088
Comparison of Classifiers In this paper, the dependability of the method
mainly depends on the accuracy performance of the path image classifier. There-
fore, we use the path image database to train and test several classifiers that
commonly used to compare their performance.
In order to avoid the impact of data imbalance on the classifiers, we firstly do
the data augmentation for the path image database. As we can see from Table 3,
there is a data imbalance of DP and FP categories. It is because in the black-box
environment, we can’t control the attack results of adversarial maps. So we need
to do data augmentation for the FP category to balance the path image dataset.
In order not to affect the authenticity of the data as much as possible, we only
flip the path images horizontally and vertically, and rotate images clockwise 90,
180 and 270 degrees (see Fig. 8). In this way, we can randomly generate the
images for FP category to the same number as the DP category.
Then we train three classifiers based on our image path dataset, that are
Support Vector Machine(SVM), Convolutional Neural Network(CNN) and Mul-
tilayer Perceptron(MLP). We compare their performance in the following four
aspects.
Comparison 1: parameters The basic structure of both MLP and CNN is
neural network. Taking CNN as an example, it is determined by multiple param-
eters such as filter size, number of convolution layers, pooling size, optimizer,
learning rate and so on. Moreover, the relationship between parameters is com-
plex. So it is difficult to determine which parameter has a greater influence on
the classification. However, the parameters of the SVM are much fewer. To de-
termine an SVM classifier, we only need to select a type of kernel and adjust
the related parameters of kernel. Obviously, the parameters of SVM are easier
to control and adjust than neural networks.
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Flipped vertically
270° clockwise
Flipped horizontally
180° clockwise90° clockwise
Original Image
Fig. 8. The augmentation for path images of FP category.
Comparison 2: training set The neural network structures generally re-
quire a large amount of training data to train the model due to the complicated
parameters. Whereas, SVM can achieve a high accuracy based on a small train-
ing set. We use different proportions of training set to train the classifiers, and
the accuracy of the three classifiers are shown in Fig. 9. It can be seen that for
these three classifiers, the accuracy all increases when the number of training set
increases. More specifically, the accuracy of CNN do not improve significantly,
which is probably because the amount of training set is not enough for neural
network structures. However, SVM can achieve a very high accuracy with a small
size of training set.
Comparison 3: training time For the classification of images, the training
time will generally be affected by the size of images. When comparing the train-
ing time of neural networks and traditional classifiers, it is also necessary to
consider the number of iterations. In general, SVM requires much fewer itera-
tions than CNN to achieve convergence. For a small training set, the training
time of SVM will be much smaller than CNN. As shown in Table 4, it is a com-
parison of training time for the three classifiers. It can be seen that for the same
training data, the training time of the SVM is much smaller than CNN and MLP
with the setting of 10 epochs and 64 batch size.
Comparison 4: test accuracy We randomly split the path image dataset
into the training set and the testing set with a ratio of 7:3. We use the balanced
training set to train the classifier, and use the testing set in real situation to
test the classifiers. The test accuracy comparison of the three classifiers is as
shown in Table 5. It can be seen that CNN is not suitable for the path image
classification in our experiment. In contrast, the traditional SVM classifier have
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Fig. 9. The accuracy of different number of training set.
Table 4. The training-time comparison of classifiers
Algorithms Training Time (70% dataset)
Support Vector Machine 46 s
Convolutional Neural Network 474s (batch size = 64, epochs = 10)
Multilayer Perceptron 105s (batch size = 64, epochs = 10)
an unexpectedly high test accuracy. After our analysis of the classifiers and
experimental data, we think it is because there is so little pixel information in
path images that CNN model cannot obtain much effective information through
the convolution layers. In addition, our training set is not large enough for the
neural networks. Therefore, SVM can achieve a higher accuracy than CNN and
MLP for the path image classification.
Table 5. The accuracy comparison of classifiers
Algorithms Test Accuracy (Balanced Training Set)
Support Vector Machine 0.97
Convolutional Neural Network 0.76
Multilayer Perceptron 0.68
In conclusion, although CNN is widely used in image classification, it is not
suitable for our dataset. Considering the above four aspects of comparison, SVM
is more suitable for path image classification. SVM can not only achieve a high
accuracy for a small-sized training set, but also has a short training time and
more convenient adjustment of parameters. Therefore, we select the traditional
SVM classifier which has a best classification effect on the path image dataset.
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Dependability Evaluation In addition, we evaluate the confidence of SVM
classifier using ROC curve and Precision-Recall curve (see Fig 10). For the im-
balance dataset, although the test accuracy reaches 0.91, the AP of PR curve
and the AUC of ROC curve are relatively low, indicating that the classification
is affected by the categories. After data augmentation, the test accuracy reaches
0.97 and the AP and AUC are close to 1. This illustrates that the test accuracy
of SVM classifier is in high confidence.
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Fig. 10. The PR and ROC curve of SVM before and after data augmentation
Feasibility Evaluation We selected 100 path pairs from the dataset to evaluate
the processing time, including 40 path pairs from FP and DP categories in the
testing set, and 60 path pairs randomly selected from UrP and UcP categories.
We compare the processing time of our training-based method and the manual
observation method. The processing-time comparison of two methods are shown
in the Table 6. Obviously, the method proposed in this paper has a considerable
processing speed and can realize a fast identification of VIN adversarial examples.
In summary, the identification approach we proposed can achieve a fast identifi-
cation for VIN adversarial examples. The combination of path features compar-
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Table 6. The processing-time comparison of two methods
Methods Processing Time (100 path pairs)
Training-based Method 0.22s
Manual Observation Method 300s (approximately)
ison and path images classification can ensure the high-accuracy of the classifi-
cation and the high-speed of the identification approach.
6 Conclusion
This paper mainly focuses on the VIN adversarial examples in the domain
of robot path planning. We define the four categories of adversarial maps by
analysing the possible impacts that adversarial maps may cause on VIN path
planning. Based on the categories definition, we implement a training-based iden-
tification method by combining the path feature comparison and path images
classification. The experiments prove that our method can effectively identify
VIN adversarial examples automatically. In future work, we will further study
whether our identification approach is applicable to the adversarial examples of
other DRL algorithms in the domain of path planning.
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